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Abstract
In an attempt to reduce automobile insurance rates1 and the cost of
automobile accidents2 in Florida, the legislature enacted the “Florida
Automobile Reparations Reform Act” in 1971.
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COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE:
FLORIDA STATUTE § 627.7372.
In an attempt to reduce automobile insurance rates1 and the cost of
automobile accidents2 in Florida, the legislature enacted the "Florida
Automobile Reparations Reform Act" in 1971.8 This act, which be-
came effective in 1972, contained basic concepts of no-fault insurance,
personal injury protection (PIP) benefits, and certain "threshold re-
quirements. ' 4 The plan, however, did not serve to reduce the cost of
automobile insurance, causing the Florida Legislature to modify the
act.'
Though innovative in some regards, the modified no-fault legisla-
tion failed to produce the reduction in insurance rates promised by its
drafters. Once again, the Florida Legislature attempted to resolve the
problem, and in 1977 the "Florida Automobile Reparations Reform
Act of 1977" emerged.8 It was here that section 627.7372 of the Flor-
ida Statutes, regarding the admissibility of payments made by collat-
eral sources, was initially created.7 Since 1977, the Legislature has seen
fit to amend this act and it is likely that legislative innovation, as well
as experimentation, will continue in this field.9
1. Levin, Visiting Florida's No-Fault Experience: Is It Now Constitutional?, 54
FLA. B.J. 123 (1980).
2. J. ALPERT & P. MURPHY, FLORIDA AUTOMOBILE REPARATIONS § 1-1 (1980).
See, e.g., Powers, Automobile Accident Reparations Controversy: Current Status, 44
FLA. B.J. 186 (April 1970).
3. FLA. STAT. §§ 627.730-741 (1971).
4. J. ALPERT & P. MURPHY, supra note 2.
5. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION COMMITTEE, THE FLA. BAR, FLORIDA No-
FAULT INSURANCE PRACTICE (2d ed. 1979). See J. ALPERT & P. MURPHY, supra note
2 for more detailed information on this legislation.
6. FLA. S.B. 1181 (1977) creating ch. 77-468, 1977 Fla. Laws 2057.
7. Id. § 34.
8. Ch. 78-374, 1978 Fla. Laws 1041.
9. Change will in fact occur by virtue of the automatic repeal of the Act on July
1, 1982.
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF SECTION 627.7372
The 'collateral source rule' states that "total or partial compensa-
tion for an injury received by an injured party from a collateral source
wholly independent of the wrongdoer will not operate to lessen the
damages recoverable from the person causing the injury."10 With few
exceptions, this rule has been adhered to by the Florida courts"" and
continues to be in use today.1 2 However, in recent years, an exception
to this rule has emerged in cases involving the operation of a motor
vehicle within the confines of the no-fault act.1 3
A. 1977. Florida Statute § 627.7372
Florida Statute § 627.7372 entitled "Collateral Souces of Indem-
nity" became effective on July 1, 1977 and provides that:
(1) In an action for personal injury or wrongful death arising out of
the ownership, operation, use or maintenance of a motor vehicle, the
court shall admit into evidence the total amount of all collateral sources
which have been paid to the claimant prior to the commencement of the
trial. The- court shall also admit into evidence any amount paid by the
claimant to secure such collateral source.14
The second part of the statute enumerates payments to the claimant
that will be considered "collateral sources."1 5 An illustration of this
10. 15 AM. JUR. Damages § 198 (1938); 25 C.J.S. Damages § 99 (1941).
11. 17 FLA. JUR. 2d Damages § 39 (1980); Paradis v. Thomas, 150 So. 2d 457
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
12. Hartnett v. Riveron, 361 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1978).
13. The Florida Insurance and Tort Reform Act of 1977, § 34, FLA. STAT. §
627.7372 (1977). Exception to the collateral source rule has also been taken in medical
malpractice suits by virtue of FLA. STAT. § 768.50 (1979). Much of the information in
this note may be applied to section 768.50. However, some underlying differences do
exist between the two statutes. This note will be confined to a discussion of section
627.7372.
14. FLA. STAT. § 627.7372(1) (1977).
15. (2) For purposes of this section, "collateral sources" means any pay-
ments made to the claimant, or on his behalf, by or pursuant to:
(a) The United States Social Security Act; any federal, state, or local income
disability act; or any other public programs providing medical expenses, disabil-
ity payments, or other similar benefits.
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rule is as follows:
Plaintiff is injured in an automobile accident with defendant caus-
ing plaintiff to institute a suit against the defendant tortfeasor. How-
ever, prior to the commencement of the.trial, plaintiff collects $10,000
through her PIP benefits provided under her insurance policy. Sbction
627.7372 provides that this $10,000 payment will be admissible evi-
dence at the time of trial.16
B. 1978: Florida Statute § 627.7372
Upon the continuation of soaring insurance rates in Florida, in
1978 the legislature, once again, amended the collateral source statute
to read:
(1) In any action for personal injury or wrongful death arising out
of the ownership, operation, use, or maintenance of a motor vehicle, the
court shall admit into evidence the total amount of all collateral sources
paid to the claimant, and the court shall instruct the jury to deduct
from its verdict the value of all benefits received by the claimant from
any collateral source.17
Two major changes were adopted in the 1978 amendment. First,
the statute no longer allows into evidence amounts paid to secure the
collateral source. Second, the court must now instruct the jury to de-
duct from its verdict the value of all collateral source benefits received
by the claimant. This statute became effective January 1, 1979 and
remains in effect at the time of publication of this note.18
(b) Any health, sickness, or income disability insurance; automobile accident in-
surance that provides health benefits or income disability coverage; and any other
similar insurance benefits except life insurance benefits available to the claimant,
whether purchased by him or provided by others.
(c) Any contract or agreement of any group, organization, partnership, or corpo-
ration to provide, pay for, or reimburse the costs of hospital, medical, dental, or
other health care services.
(d) Any contractual or voluntary wage continuation plan provided by employers
or any other system intended to provide wages during a period of disability.
16. This hypothetical assumes compliance with all aspects of the no-fault act.
17. FLA. STAT. § 627.7372 (Supp. 1978) (emphasis supplied). It should be noted
that section 627.7372(2) remained the same.
18. Effective August 1, 1979, the statute was amended to include: "(3) Notwith-
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II. RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
"The constitutionality of most no-fault laws has been based on a
1916 United States Supreme Court decision .. ."1 The first constitu-
tional, challenge to reach the Florida Supreme Court, however, oc-
curred in 1973.2o The court in Kluger v. White ruled that Florida Stat-
ute § 627.73821 was unconstitutional.22 The court held that this statute
denied a plaintiff the right of access to the courts for redress of a par-
ticular injury without providing a reasonable alternative to protect that
right.2" The threshold requirements of the Florida no-fault act 2' faced
constitutional challenges in Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co.25 However,
the court rejected all the arguments set forth in Kluger and upheld the
provisions of no-fault. "We now hold, however, that with one exception,
the personal injury aspects of F.S. 627.737, F.S.A., are valid and
constitutional. ' 26
Recently, there has been a great deal of controversy concerning
the collateral source provision of the no-fault act. A growing number of
circuit court judges throughout the state have held the statute unconsti-
tutional, thus prohibiting the admission into evidence at trial of collat-
standing any other provisions of this section, benefits received under the Workers'
Compensation Law shall not be considered a collateral source." FLA. STAT. §
627.7372(3) (1979).
19. Levin, supra note 1, at 124 (citing to Atlantic Coastline R.R. Co. v. Mims,
242 U.S. 532 (1916)).
20. J. ALPERT & P. MURPHY, supra note 2, at § 1-20 (citing Kluger v. White,
281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973)).
21. This statute, which abolished the traditional right of action in tort for prop-
erty damage arising from an automobile accident, required the plaintiff to seek prop-
erty damage compensation from his own insurer unless he was not insured for property
damage and met a $550 threshold requirement.
22. 281 So. 2d at 5. The court found the statute was in violation of FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 21.
23. 281 So. 2d at 4.
24. FLA. STAT. § 627.737 (1971).
25. 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974).
26. Id. at 13. The exception declared unconstitutional was that portion of the
statute allowing recovery for pain and suffering when the injury was a fracture to a
weight-bearing bone, even if the $1,000 threshold of the Act was not met. Additionally,
four years later, ch. 77-468, § 42, 1977 Fla. Laws 2087, which dealt with the "Good
Drivers Incentive Fund" was severed from the Act on the basis of its constitutionality.
State v. Lee, 356 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1978).
1264 5:1981 1
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eral source benefits paid to the claimant.27 In so doing, the courts have
embraced the constitutional arguments as set forth in Kluger and
Lasky. These arguments include: denial of access to courts,28 invasion
of the court's rulemaking authority,29 impairment of the right to con-
tract,30 denial of equal protection s' and due process.3 2
A. Access to Courts
Article I, Section 21 of the Florida Constitution guarantees every
citizen his day in court. "The courts shall be open to every person for
redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale,
denial or delay."133
In Kluger v. White, the Supreme Court of Florida determined that
the legislature could not abolish a common law or statutory cause of
action "without providing a reasonable alternative to protect the rights
of the people.. ., unless the legislature can show an overpowering pub-
lic necessity ... ." The same argument is now sought to be applied to
the collateral source statute. 5
In applying this argument to the collateral source statute, it must
be noted that the statute was intended to prevent the duplication of
27. Puchaty v. Teague, No. 79-5183 (Fla. 18th Cir. Ct., filed Feb. 26, 1980);
Womble v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., No. 79-9107 (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct., filed Mar. 21,
1980) (prohibiting the admission of collateral sources, but not explicitly declaring the
statute unconstitutional); Berman v. Poole, No. 78-21175 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct., filed Apr.
23, 1980); Jenkins v. Rafferty, No. 79-4593 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct., filed Oct. 1, 1980)
(prohibiting the admission of collateral sources, but not explicitly declaring the statute
unconstitutional); Cooper v. Pepper, No. 79-8819 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct., filed Oct. 21,
1980). These orders represent part of a growing number. But see note 69 infra.
28. FLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 21.
29. FLA. CoNsT. art. II, § 3; FLA. CoNsT. art. V, § 2(a).
30. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 10.
31. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
32. FLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. This challenge, although
asserted, has not been expounded on by either plaintiffs' or defendants' motions or the
respective orders. See cases cited in note 27 supra. This article will not therefore spe-
cifically address this challenge.
33. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
34. 281 So. 2d at 4.
35. See plaintiffs' motions in connection with their respective orders for the cases
cited in note 27 supra.
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benefits..8 There is, however, no Florida law, statutory or otherwise,
which grants the right of a claimant to a double recovery. Secondly,
the statute continues to preserve a claimant's right to seek legal redress
against a tortfeasor. It. is the threshold requirements that may deny a
claimant his day in court, but it is the collateral source statute that
limits claimant's damages to a single recovery.37
An argument has been asserted that the admission of evidence re-
garding a claimant's receipt of collateral sources "involves a substantial
likelihood of prejudicial impact."3 8 However, the possibility of
prejudice should be weighed (as a matter of public policy) against the
possibility of double recovery. This will further have to be balanced
with the underlying purpose of the "Florida Insurance and Tort Re-
form Act of 1977," which is to reduce insurance premiums.39
Another problem arises when a particular collateral source insurer
maintains a subrogated interest in the claimant's recovery, thus result-
ing in a double reduction. 40 The courts have not addressed this issue
with respect to the constitutional validity of Section 627.7372. One via-
ble approach is the argument that since a plaintiff does not have the
right to recover these amounts, an insurance company, thus, cannot
maintain the right to subrogation. 1
The question of whether Section 627.7372 denies a claimant's con-
stitutional right of access to the courts raises some valid arguments on
both sides of the issue. When this statute is reviewed by higher courts
in Florida, this concern may very well be the focus in determining the
constitutional validity of the statute.
36. This would in turn, hopefully, assist in decreasing insurance rates.
37. The statute states in part: "[T]he court shall instruct the jury to deduct from
its verdict the value of all benefits received by the claimant from any collateral source."
FLA. STAT. § 627.7372(1) (Supp. 1978) (emphasis supplied). The collateral source
statute becomes moot if a jury does not find the defendant liable.
38. Eichel v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 375 U.S. 253, 255 (1963).
39. FLA. S.B. 1181 (1977). Furthermore, it would not be in the province of the
courts to decide that these conditions no longer exist. "When the validity of the law
depends on the existence of certain facts necessary to be determined by the legislature,
the court will presume the requisite facts are established to that body's satisfaction."
Florida State Bd. of Architecture v. Wasserman, 377 So. 2d 653, 657 (Fla. 1979).
40. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 5, at § 5.31.
41. Id.
6
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B. Invasion of the Court's Rulemaking Authority
Article II, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution espouses the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine and reads in part:
"No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any power ap-
"142pertaining to either of the other branches ....
Article V, Section 2(a) of the Florida Constitution enumerates
certain powers of the Supreme Court:
"The Supreme Court shall adopt rules for the practice and proce-
dure in all Courts ....
As a result of these two constitutional provisions, the state legisla-
ture is prohibited from adopting any statute which regulates practice
and procedure in the courts." Whether this collateral source statute is
substantive or procedural is another basis for determining its validity.
The area of substance versus procedure has been described as a
"twilight zone. ' 5 In Parker v. Wideman," the Fifth Circuit addressed
this issue and held that the question of admissibility of collateral
sources is a substantive one. "But the fact of the matter is that under
Florida law the rule is a substantive rule of law which applies whether
or not evidence of collateral compensation is introduced.' 7
However, the portion of the statute which requires the court to
instruct the jury on the effect of the evidence presents a more difficult
substantive versus procedural problem. This mandatory jury instruction
clearly seems procedural in nature. As Justice Adkins noted,.
"[p]ractice and procedure pertains to the legal machinery by which
substantive law is made effective."'" If this portion of the statute is
determined by the courts to be a matter of procedure, it would be pos-
sible for the Supreme Court to adopt it in their rules of practice and
42. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3.
43. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a).
44. In re Clarification of Fla. Rules of Practice and Procedure, 281 So. 2d 204
(Fla. 1978).
45. In re Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure; 272 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1972) (Adkins,
J., concurring), affd, 272 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1973).
46. 380 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1967).
47. Id. at 436. See Finley P. Smith, Inc. v. Schectman, 132 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Annot., 68 A.L.R. 2d 876 (1959); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 92,
Comment e at 620.
48. 272 So. 2d at 65 (Adkins, J., concurring).
7
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procedure.4 9 When the Civil Rules of Procedure were adopted, statutes
which were procedural but did not supersede or conflict with the rules,
remained in effect.50
The admissibility .of collateral sources is arguably substantive in
light of the holding in Parker. However, the purpose of admitting this
evidence is effectuated if the jury is instructed to deduct the amount
from its verdict. This mandatory instruction, which was added to the
original statute in the 1978 amendment,51 expanded the collateral
source rule with the intention of reducing final verdicts and aiding in
the overall intent of reducing automobile insurance rates.52 The statute
could be amended, however, to eliminate the jury instruction, which
would result in a statute similar to the one in 1977. 53
C. Impairment of the Plaintiffs Right to Contract
It is undisputed that legislative enactments impairing a person's
right to contract are a constitutional violation." Article I, Section 10 of
the Florida Constitution reads:
"No bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the obli-
gation of contracts shall be passed."55 It has been argued that the col-
lateral source statute violates this provision by impairing the value of a
plaintiff's contract with his insurer."
The term impairment has been defined in Florida as "[a]ny con-
duct on the part of the legislature that detracts in any way from the
49. 281 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1973). See Sun Ins. Office Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735
(Fla. 1961).
50. In re Fla. Rules of Civil Procedure (1967 Revision), 187 So. 2d 598 (Fla.
1967).
51. FLA. STAT. § 627.7372 (Supp. 1978).
52. FLA. S.B. 1308 (1978). See Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Statement,
June 1, 1978 (Brainerd).
53. "If, when the unconstitutional part of a statute is striken, that which remains
is complete in itself and capable of being executed in accordance with the apparent
legislative intent, the valid portion of the statute will be sustained." Lasky v. State
Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d at 21.
54. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 10.
55. Id.
56. See Memorandum of Law in support of plaintiff's motion in limine, Lang v.
Halfpenny, No. 79-3470 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct., filed Sept. 11, 1980).
8
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value of the contract . . .. The Florida Supreme Court was con-
fronted with a similar situation when they considered the question
whether the enactment of the anti-stacking statute58 impaired the value
of a claimant's pre-existing insurance policy.59 The court upheld the
statute and decided it was "a reasonable exercise of the state's undis-
puted authority to regulate the insurance industry in furtherance of
the public welfare."60 It is possible the court will follow this reasoning
when considering the collateral source statute.
D. Equal Protection
It has been advanced that Section 627.7372 violates the equal pro-
tection clause of the United States Constitution61 and Article I, Section
2 of the Florida Constitution as it applies only to actions for personal
injury or wrongful death arising out of the operation, use or mainte-
nance of a motor vehicle.62 However, "[w]hen the difference between
those included in a class and those excluded from it bears a substantial
relationship to the legislative purpose, the classification does not deny
equal protection." 63
It is undisputed that Section 627.7372 creates a classification of
persons injured in motor vehicle accidents. However, this classification
is probably not arbitrary since it is a valid legislative response to the
57. Pinellas County v. Banks, 19 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1944) (emphasis supplied).
58. FLA. STAT. § 627.4132 (1976).
59. Gillette v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 374 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 1979).
Although this issue was brought up a year earlier, the question of the statute's constitu-
tional validity was left open. The court merely invalidated the application of the stat-
ute to the particular facts at bar. Dewberry v. Auto-owners Ins. Co., 363 So. 2d 1077
(Fla. 1978).
60. 374 So. 2d at 526 (emphasis supplied).
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
62. See Memoranda of Law filed on behalf of plaintiffs' motions in connection
with the cases cited in note 27 supra. Some of these memoranda suggest the statute
also discriminates against tortfeasors by providing an unwarranted benefit to the negli-
gent motor vehicle operator and not to one who is negligent in some other manner, but
causes identical injuries. However, research did not reveal any cases whereby a
tortfeasor, or his insurance company, asserted a claim based on a denial of equal pro-
tection because his unfortunate victim is without collateral source benefits, which could
have been deducted from a potential judgment rendered against him.
63. 296 So. 2d at 18.
2691Collateral Source Rule15:1981
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insurance crisis which confronted the public in the 1970's. Further-
more, classifications which discriminate between persons injured in mo-
tor vehicle accidents are not unconstitutional. The Florida Supreme
Court in Lasky" was called upon to examine this identical classifica-
tion to determine whether the threshold requirements of the no-fault
act were a denial of equal protection. The court decided this classifica-
tion did not violate the equal protection clause even though the classifi-
cation determined a person's right of access to the courts."8
In addition to being non-arbitrary, Section 627.7372 must bear a
substantial relationship to the legislative purpose in order to sustain its
validity.66 This requirement is arguably met after viewing this statute
as an overall scheme to resolve the insurance crisis. "Merely because
the Legislature has seen fit to remedy a perceived evil in one area, it is
not compelled to extend that remedy to all areas in which it might be
applied."' 67 Compelling the legislature to pursue an all or nothing ap-
proach would not be favorable.6 8 In light of the holding in Lasky, it
seems unlikely that higher courts in Florida will find this statute to be
in violation of the equal protection clause.69
Lori M. Lapin
64. Id.
65. Id. at 22.
66. Id. at 18.
67. Id. at 22.
68. Id.
69. Shortly before publication of this note, a unanimous First District Court Ap-
peal upheld the constitutionality of section 627.7372. The court rejected all the argu-
ments raised in this note except the constitutionality of the jury instruction, which was
not raised. McKee v. City of Jacksonville, 1981 Fla. Law Weekly 4 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. Jan. 6, 1981).
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